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We discuss quantum key distribution protocols using quantum continuous variables.
We show that such protocols can be made secure against individual gaussian attacks
regardless the transmission of the optical line between Alice and Bob. This is achieved by
reversing the reconciliation procedure subsequent to the quantum transmission, that is,
using Bob’s instead of Alice’s data to build the key. Although squeezing or entanglement
may be helpful to improve the resistance to noise, they are not required for the protocols
to remain secure with high losses. Therefore, these protocols can be implemented very
simply by transmitting coherent states and performing homodyne detection.
Here, we show that entanglement nevertheless plays a crucial role in the security anal-
ysis of coherent state protocols. Every cryptographic protocol based on displaced gaus-
sian states turns out to be equivalent to an entanglement-based protocol, even though no
entanglement is actually present. This equivalence even holds in the absence of squeez-
ing, for coherent state protocols. This “virtual” entanglement is important to assess
the security of these protocols as it provides an upper bound on the mutual information
between Alice and Bob if they had used entanglement. The resulting security criteria
are compared to the separability criterion for bipartite gaussian variables. It appears
that the security thresholds are well within the entanglement region. This supports the
idea that coherent state quantum cryptography may be unconditionally secure.
Keywords: Quantum key distribution, quantum cryptography, continuous variables, co-
herent states, quantum entanglement
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1 Introduction
1.1 Continuous-variable quantum cryptography
In the presently very active field of continuous variable quantum information processing, a
stimulating question is whether quantum continuous variables (QCV) [1] may provide a valid
alternative to the usual “single photon” quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes [2]. Many
recent proposals to use QCV for QKD (for a short review see [3]) have been based upon the
use of “non-classical” states, such as squeezed or entangled light beams. We have nevertheless
shown [3], and experimentally demonstrated [4], that there is actually no need for squeezed
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or entangled light: QKD can be implemented simply by generating and transmitting random
distributions of coherent states. More precisely, coherent state protocols are secure against in-
dividual gaussian attacks, while their security with respect to the line transmission depends on
the reconciliation protocol which is used by Alice and Bob to correct the transmission errors.
Using the so-called “direct reconciliation” (DR) protocols, a whole family of secure protocols
can be obtained by using either coherent states, squeezed states, or Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
[5] (EPR) entangled beams [3, 6, 7], provided that the transmission of the line is larger than
50 percent (i.e. the losses are less than 3 dB). The security of these protocols is related to the
limit imposed on the cloning of gaussian states [8, 9, 10], so that non-classical features like
squeezing or EPR correlations have no influence on the achievable secret key rate. Interest-
ingly, the 3 dB loss limit of these cryptographic protocols may be circumvented by modifying
the reconciliation protocol. In ref. [4, 11], we have introduced “reverse reconciliation” (RR)
protocols, and demonstrated their security for any value of the line transmission. Note that
there exist, in principle, other ways for Alice and Bob to go beyond the 3 dB limit of DR
protocols, namely by using entanglement purification [12] or postselection [13].
In the present paper, we will first review some basic properties of the direct and reverse rec-
onciliation protocols. Then, we will show that each prepare-and-measure continuous-variable
protocol is equivalent to an entanglement-based QKD protocol. This equivalence reminds
us the link between the entanglement-free BB84 protocol [14] and the EPR-based protocol
proposed by Ekert [15] that was pointed out in [16]. This equivalence allows us to com-
pute the best estimate Alice may have on Bob’s measurement outcome, if she had used an
entanglement-based protocol. This, in turn, allows us to upper bound the information that
an eavesdropper, Eve, can have on Bob’s measurement results. In the case of a channel with
losses but no added noise, Eve’s estimate turns out to be always worse than Alice’s estimate,
which is the main reason for the increased security achieved by reversing the reconciliation
protocol. Finally we will compare the security criteria derived from our approach to the
entanglement criterion for bipartite gaussian variables. It appears that the corresponding se-
curity thresholds are well within the entanglement region, supporting the idea that coherent
states quantum cryptography may be unconditionally secure.
1.2 Direct and reverse reconciliation protocols
In the first step of a generic QKD protocol, Alice prepares a quantum state and sends it to Bob,
who makes a measurement on the state. Alternatively, Alice and Bob may share two EPR-
correlated systems and both make a measurement on their part. In order to warrant security,
Alice and Bob must randomly choose to use different measurement bases, the transmitted
data being kept only when the bases are compatible. After the quantum exchange, they thus
have to agree on a common measurement basis, and discard the wrong measurements. At
the end of this step, Alice, Bob, and the potential eavesdropper Eve, share a set of correlated
data, called “key elements”.
In a second step, Alice reveals some randomly chosen sample of the data that she sent,
and Bob reveals his corresponding measurements. These samples allow them to measure some
relevant parameters of the quantum channel, e.g. the error rate and the transmission (called
“channel gain” for QCV protocols). Knowing the correlations between their key elements,
Alice and Bob can evaluate the amount of information they share (IAB), and the information
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the eavesdropper Eve may have at most about their key elements (IAE and IBE). Therefore
they can evaluate the size of the secret key they will be able to generate at the end of the
protocol. If Eve knows too much, the size of this secret key will be zero, and Alice and Bob
abort the protocol at this point.
In a third step, called “reconciliation”, Alice and Bob use classical communications to
extract a common binary key from their correlated key elements, revealing as little information
as possible to a third party ignoring these key elements. This step usually uses parity-
based algorithms like Cascade. It was adapted to continuous variables in Refs. [7, 17], where
a “sliced” error correction procedure was devised in order to provide reconciled bits from
real-values key elements. There are actually two main options for doing the reconciliation,
depending on whether Alice’s or Bob’s data are used to build the key. We will call these two
options “direct reconciliation” (DR) and “reverse reconciliation” (RR), respectively, and will
detail these procedures in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. The starting point will be the Csiszar-
Ko¨rner theorem [18, 19] stating that a sufficient condition for distilling a secret key is that
max(IAB − IAE , IAB − IBE) > 0, the first and second term corresponding to DR and RR,
resepctively.
Finally, the fourth step of a practical QKD protocol consists in Alice and Bob performing
“privacy amplification” in order to filter out Eve’s information. Since this step is based on
an evaluation of the amount of information collected by Eve on the reconciled key, a crucial
requirement is to get a bound on IAE for DR, or on IBE for RR. For a coherent state protocol,
the DR bound was given in ref. [3], and leads to a security limit for line with a transmission
of 1/2. In the following, we will establish the RR bound and show that it is not associated
with a minimum value of the line transmission. In order to have a general approach, we
will start by considering the exchange of entangled beams, and we will show later that for
a particular choice of the measurement performed by Alice, this is equivalent to exchanging
coherent states.
1.2.1 Direct Reconciliation (DR).
In direct reconciliation, Alice sends correction information to Bob, who accordingly corrects
his key elements to have the same values as Alice. Alice infers from her estimate of IAB the
minimum amount of information she needs to reveal at this step. If the reconciliation protocol
is perfect, it keeps IAB − IAE constant. After reconciliation, Alice and Bob know a common
bit string of length IAB (slightly less if the reconciliation protocol is not perfect), and Eve
knows IAE bits of this string. It will provide a usable secret key if IAB − IAE > 0. We
call this “direct reconciliation” (DR) because Bob is reconstructing what was sent by Alice,
and the classical information flow in this step has the same direction as the initial quantum
information flow.
Direct reconciliation is quite intuitive, and it was used in the coherent state QCV protocol
that we proposed in ref. [3]. However, it is not secure as soon as the quantum channel
transmission falls below 1/2. Intuitively, Eve could simulate the losses by a beam splitter and
look one output port of this beamsplitter. It seems obvious that, if she keeps the biggest part
of the beam sent by Alice (i.e. if she simulate losses higher than 3 dB), she can extract more
information from her beam than Bob (IAE > IAB), thus forbidding any secret key generation.
Note that this limitation is actually not specific to QCV: a “direct” version of BB84
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would be a protocol where Bob would try to fill in the “empty slots” where he did not get any
photon. Such a protocol actually only works when the losses are smaller than 3 dB. Indeed,
suppose Alice has a perfect photon-gun and sends single photons to Bob, who measures their
polarization with perfect detectors. If G < 1 denotes the transmission of the errorless lossy
channel, Bob only receives and measures a fraction G of these photons. Even if we suppose
that Bob has a quantum memory, allowing him to always make the right basis choice, we
have IAB = G. If the losses are due to Eve, which keeps the lost photons, IAE = 1−G. The
security condition IAB − IAE > 0 for a “direct” version of BB84 is therefore G > 12 . The
usual BB84 protocol works for higher losses because only the photons received by Bob (and
therefore not intercepted by Eve) are considered for the key. As we will show in Sect. 1.2.2,
this may be viewed as a reverse reconciliation where Alice corrects her value to match the
ternary digit (0,1,no photon) held by Bob.
1.2.2 Reverse Reconciliation (RR).
We may instead reverse the reconciliation in the sense that Bob sends the correction informa-
tion while Alice corrects her key elements to have the same values as Bob. Since Bob gives
the correction information (also to Eve), this type of reconciliation keeps IAB−IBE constant,
and provides a usable key if IAB − IBE > 0. We call it “reverse reconciliation” (RR) because
Alice adapts herself to what was received by Bob.
In a noiseless BB84 with finite line transmission, this step corresponds to Bob informing
Alice of his “empty slots” where he did not get any photon, and Alice discarding the cor-
responding bits in order to have the same key. In our QCV protocol, there is no “empty
slot” since homodyning the vacuum gives a gaussian distribution, and the RR procedure is
intertwined with error correction. Then, alike BB84, it allows Alice and Bob to cross the
3-dB loss limit and extract a secret key for an arbitrarily low value of the line transmission.
However, in a practical realization, one cannot attain very high losses for several reasons.
First, a realistic reconciliation protocol cannot reach the Shannon limit, so Alice and Bob
actually obtain only a fraction of the information IAB while one has to assume that Eve gets
the full information IBE . Said otherwise, the correction information that must be sent by Bob
to Alice (but which is also monitored by Eve) is slightly larger than its ideal value predicted
by Shannon theory. This makes the information difference vanish at some finite value of the
line transmission. Another problem which must be taken into account is the following: while
the RR procedure should be unidirectional (from Bob to Alice), the error correction using
Cascade is a bidirectional process, so that some information also “leaks” from Alice to Eve.
We have numerically evaluated this information leakage in practical cases [4] and it appears
to be small, so we will not consider it further in the present paper. However, it must be kept
in mind that the one-way or two-way character of the used error correction procedure plays
a role, which should not be underestimated.
2 Preparation of a modulated gaussian beam through entanglement
The QKD protocols of the references [3, 4, 6, 7, 11] are based on randomly displaced squeezed
or coherent states prepared by Alice. We will show in this section that Alice could equivalently
prepare a pair of quantum entangled beams, measure one (or both) quadratures on one beam,
and send the other beam to Bob. This will be used in Sections 3 and 4 to find the maximum
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QA
(Q, P) towards
Bob
Alice
EPR (Q’, P’)
H
Fig. 1. Measurement of a single quadrature. Alice prepares two entangled beams (Q,P )
and (Q′, P ′) using an EPR source (EPR). She measures one quadrature on one beam with an
homodyne detector (H) and deduces from it QA (or PA), which is an estimate of Q (or P ). She
sends the other beam to Bob.
information Alice may have on Bob’s data if she was using quantum entangled beams, and
in Sect. 5 to compare the security conditions with the entanglement criterion for bipartite
gaussian states.
2.1 Measurement of a single quadrature
Let us assume Alice prepares a pair of EPR beams, and denote by (Q,P ) the quadratures of
the beam sent to Bob and by (Q′, P ′) the quadratures of the beam kept by Alice (see Fig. 1).
To simplify the notations, we will suppose those beams to be initially symmetric in the two
quadratures, i.e.
〈Q2〉 = 〈Q′2〉 = V N0 〈P 2〉 = 〈P ′2〉 = V N0, (1)
where N0 is the shot-noise variance.
These beams are entangled, and the measurement of a quadrature of one beam (e.g.
Q′) gives Alice information on the same quadrature of the other beam (Q). One can show
[20, 21] that the best estimate Alice can have on Q knowing Q′ is of the form QA = αQ
′
with α = 〈QQ
′〉
〈Q′2〉
, the value of α being found by minimizing the variance of the error operator
δQA = Q−QA. The conditional variance VQ|QA of Q knowing QA quantifies the remaining
uncertainty on Q after the measurement of Q′ giving the estimate QA of Q, and we have
VQ|QA = 〈δQA2〉 = 〈Q2〉 −
|〈Q′Q〉|2
〈Q′2〉 . (2)
By using the commutation relation
[δQA, P ] = [Q,P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2iN0
−α [Q′, P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
, (3)
which directly follows from the definition of δQA, we find that the following uncertainty
relation on the beam (Q,P ) after the measurement of Q′ holds :
VQ|QA × 〈P 2〉 ≥ N20 . (4)
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Using the expression (2), we obtain
|〈Q′Q〉|2 ≤ 〈Q′2〉〈Q2〉 −N20
〈Q′2〉
〈P 2〉 . (5)
By definition, the EPR beams are maximally correlated and saturate this limit, which gives
〈Q′Q〉 =
√
V 2 − 1 N0 VQ|QA =
N0
V
(6)
Since by measuring Q′ Alice deduces QA, and since Q = QA + δQA, the beam (Q,P ) is
projected onto a Q-squeezed state of squeezing parameter s = VQ|QA/N0 = 1/V centered on
(QA, 0).
Alternatively, Alice could measure the quadrature P ′, yielding the estimator PA = −αP ′,
which gives
〈P ′ P 〉 = −
√
V 2 − 1 N0 VP |PA =
N0
V
(7)
Of course, by measuring P ′, Alice learns PA and projects the other beam onto a P -squeezed
state centered on (0, PA) with the same squeezing parameter s = 1/V .
2.2 Simultaneous measurement of Q′ and P ′
Another possibility for Alice is to measure simultaneously Q′ and P ′. In this case, her
measurement outcomes are more noisy, so she projects the beam (Q,P ) onto a lesser squeezed
state. A crucial point for our protocol is that she prepares a coherent state if her measurement
is balanced in Q and P , as we will show below.
Denoting as Q′A and P
′
A the values of Q
′ and P ′ measurements, the associated added
noises δQ′A and δP
′
A are defined as
δQ′A = Q
′ −Q′A δP ′A = P ′ − P ′A, (8)
A possible way to perform such a joint measurement is to split Alice’s beam with a beam-
splitter of transmission T (in intensity), measuring separately each quadrature at each output
port of the beamsplitter (see Fig. 2). Then, Q′A and P
′
A are the best estimators of Q
′ and P ′,
proportional to the outputs of homodyne detectors placed on each of the output port.
Since Q′A and P
′
A are known simultaneously, they commute, [Q
′
A, P
′
A] = 0. Therefore,
[δQ′A, δP
′
A] = −[Q′, P ′] and the noise variances obey the following inequality:
〈δQ′A2〉〈δP ′A2〉 ≥ N02. (9)
If this inequality is saturated, that is if Alice makes an optimal joint measurement, this
measure is characterized by the positive number µ, defined by
〈δQ′A2〉 = µN0 and 〈δP ′A2〉 =
1
µ
N0. (10)
If the measurement is made with the beamsplitter setup described above, we have
µ =
1− T
T
or T =
1
1 + µ
(11)
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QA
(Q, P) towards
Bob
Alice
PA
T
H
EPR (Q’, P’)
H
Fig. 2. Measurement of both quadratures. Alice can measure both quadratures of her beam,
as explained in the text, using a beamsplitter of transmission T and two homodyne detectors H.
She then simultaneously obtains QA and PA, which are estimates of Q and P .
If µ = 1, Alice measures Q′ and P ′ with the same (shot-noise limited) precision. This
case corresponds to a 50:50 beamsplitter (T = 12 ). If µ < 1, Alice measures Q
′ with a sub-
shotnoise accuracy. At the limit µ → 0, Alice measures perfectly Q′ but not at all P ′, since
the noise δP ′A needs to be infinite in order to fulfill the Heisenberg inequality (9). This limit
corresponds to the perfectly transmitting beamsplitter (T = 1), where nothing is reflected
to the “P -measuring port”. If µ > 1, the situation is reversed, and Alice measures P ′ more
accurately than Q′. At the limit µ → ∞, she only measures P ′, gaining no information on
Q′.
Now, from the measured quadratures Q′ and P ′, Alice can again estimate the correlated
quadratures Q and P . Her best estimate of the state of the beam (Q,P ) is given by (QA, PA),
which are now defined simultaneously:
QA =
〈QQ′A〉
〈Q′A2〉
Q′A =
√
V 2 − 1
V + µ
(Q′ − δQ′A) and PA = −
√
V 2 − 1
V + 1
µ
(P ′ − δP ′A). (12)
Using
Q = QA + δQA and P = PA + δPA, (13)
with δQA and δPA defining the noise of the estimators, the conditional variances can be
expressed as
VQ|QA = 〈δQA2〉 = 〈Q2〉 −
〈QQA〉2
〈QA2〉
=
(
V − (V
2 − 1)
(V + µ)
)
N0
=
µV + 1
V + µ
N0 (14a)
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QA
(Q, P) towards
Bob
Alice
PA
δ δ(  Q ,  P )A A
APAQ
Mod
RNG
Src
Fig. 3. Equivalent black box. The system sketched in Fig. 2 is equivalent to this black box.
A random number generator (RNG) gives two values QA and PA. A squeezed (or coherent if
s = 1) state source (Src) generates the beam (δQA, δPA), wich is then displaced in phase space by
(QA, PA) using a modulator (Mod).
and
VP |PA = 〈δPA2〉 = 〈P 2〉 −
〈P PA〉2
〈PA2〉
=
(
V − (V
2 − 1)
(V + 1
µ
)
)
N0
=
V + µ
µV + 1
N0 =
N0
2
VQ|QA
(14b)
Said otherwise, the measurement of Q′ and P ′ projects the beam (Q,P ) onto a squeezed state
of variances VQ|QA and VP |PA . Then, it is clear that if the measurement is symmetric in Q
′
an P ′ (i.e. if µ = 1), one has VQ|QA = VP |PA = N0 and the beam (Q,P ) is projected onto a
coherent state. The mean values of the quadratures of the beam (Q,P ) are given by QA and
PA, so things happen as if Alice had prepared a randomly displaced squeezed (or coherent)
state.
2.3 Virtual entanglement
Let us suppose the EPR source and the measuring apparatus of Alice are hidden in a black
box. The only things coming out of this black box are the values of QA and PA, and the
beam (Q,P ). This black box is indistinguishable from an equivalent black box, sketched in
Fig. 3, where QA and PA are chosen by the adequate random generator and the beam (Q,P )
is in the displaced squeezed state centered around (QA, PA). Its squeezing factor is
s =
VQ|QA
N0
=
µV + 1
V + µ
, (15)
and the equations (14) can be rewritten
VQ|QA = 〈δQA2〉 =sN0 and VP |PA = 〈δPA2〉 =
N0
s
(16)
The black box with µ = 0 and in the case Q and P are randomly interchanged allows
therefore to prepare the randomly displaced squeezed states that are used in the QKD protocol
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described in [6, 7]. If we fix µ to any given value, we realize all of the protocols presented in
[3]. In particular, since µ = 1 corresponds to the preparation of a coherent state (s = 1), the
modulated coherent states QKD protocols used in [3, 4, 11] are equivalent to entanglement-
based protocols even if they neither use squeezing nor entanglement. This possibility to
prepare randomly displaced coherent states with an entanglement-based setup was implicitly
present in our previous security studies of individual gaussian attacks on reverse reconciliation
protocols [4, 11]. It is also useful to extend the Gottesman-Preskill proof of unconditional
security of squeezed-state protocols [22] in an attempt to demonstrate the security of coherent-
state protocols with respect to general attacks [23].
We call this possibility virtual entanglement : even if Alice does not actually use entangle-
ment to create her coherent (or squeezed) states, there exists an equivalent setup (the black
box described above) which uses entanglement to create them. This relies on the fact that the
outputs of any physical apparatus, including Eve’s eavesdropping system, can only depend
on the density matrix of its input (in this case, the beam sent by Alice), and not on the
way it was prepared. Cryptographic security is then related not to the transmission of “real”
entanglement, but rather to the ability of the quantum channel to transmit entanglement, as
we will show below.
3 Bounding Eve’s attack on reverse reconciliation
3.1 Entangling cloner
Alice Bob
(Q , P )
B
E E
B(Q , P )(Q, P)
EC
Eve
Fig. 4. Eve’s attack on reverse reconciliation. To attack a reverse reconciliation QKD
protocol, Eve uses an entangling cloner (EC). It takes Alice’s beam (Q,P ) as input and produces
two entangled outputs, (QE , PE), which is kept by Eve, and (QB , PB), which is sent to Bob
through a perfect line.
To eavesdrop a reverse reconciliation scheme, Eve needs to guess the results of Bob’s
measurement. We will call entangling cloner a system allowing her to do so, because this kind
of system can be described as a cloner creating two entangled outputs, Eve keeping one of
them and sending the other one to Bob (see Fig. 4). Here (Q,P ) are the input quadratures
of the entangling cloner and (QB, PB), (QE , PE) the quadratures of its two outputs. A good
entangling cloner should minimize the conditional variances [20, 21] VQB |QE and VPB |PE .
Alice and Bob should assume Eve uses the best possible entangling cloner, knowing the
Alice-Bob channel quality. This channel can be described by
QB =
√
GQ (Q+ δQB) and PB =
√
GP (P + δPB), (17)
with 〈
δQ2B
〉
= χQ N0,
〈
δP 2B
〉
= χP N0 and 〈QδQB〉 = 〈P δPB〉 = 0 (18)
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3.2 Heisenberg inequalities on Alice’s and Eve’s conditional variances
For reverse reconciliation protocols, Alice needs to evaluate QB. Her estimator can be noted
βQA, with β =
〈QA QB〉
〈QB2〉
= V−s√
GQ(V+χQ)
. Eve’s estimator for PB will be PE . The error of these
estimators are
QB|A = QB − βQA and PB|E = PB − PE . (19)
The commutator of these two quantities is then equal to
[QB|A, PB|E ] = [QB, PB]− β [QA, PB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
− [QB, PE ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+β [QA, PE ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
. (20)
We have therefore [QB|A, PB|E ] = [QB, PB ] = 2iN0. This commutation relation leads to the
following inequality on conditional variances:
VQB |QAVPB |PE ≥ N20 and VPB |PAVQB |QE ≥ N20 , (21)
the second inequality being obtained by exchanging the roles of Q and P . These inequalities
mean that Alice and Eve cannot jointly know more about Bob’s field than allowed by the
Heisenberg principle.
3.3 Alice’s conditional variance
Alice’s conditional variance on QB is
VQB |QA =
〈
Q2B
〉− 〈QAQB〉2〈Q2A〉 = GQV N0 +GQχQN0 −GQV N0 +GQsN0
= GQ(χQ + s)N0 (22)
A similar calculation leads to the symmetric relation
VPB |PA = GP (χP +
1
s
)N0. (23)
These conditional variances depend on the amount of squeezing s Alice generates with her
black-box. Therefore, the constraint on squeezing 1
V
< s < V gives us the minimal values of
these conditional variances
VPB |PA ≥ VPB |PA,min = GP (χP + 1V )N0 (24)
VQB |QA ≥ VQB |QA,min = GQ(χQ + 1V )N0 (25)
3.4 Eve’s conditional variance
The output-output correlations of an entangling cloner, described e.g. by VPB |PE , should only
depend on the density matrix of the field (Q,P ) at its input, and not on the way this field was
built. The inequality (21) has thus to be fulfilled for every physically allowed value of VQB |QA ,
given the density matrix of the field (Q,P ). Since this field is gaussian, its density matrix is
uniquely defined by its covariance matrix, i.e. by the parameters 〈Q2〉 = 〈P 2〉 = V N0 and
〈Q P 〉 = 0, and we have to consider all possible black-boxes (those of Fig. 2 as well as those
of Fig. 3). In order to bound Eve’s knowledge by using Eq.(21), we thus have to use the
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tightest limit on VQB |QA , which is given by VQB |QA,min according to (25). Obviously the same
reasoning holds for VPB |PA , with the corresponding tightest limit VPB |PA,min.
We have then
VQB |QE ≥ VQB |QE ,min =
N0
GP (χP + 1/V )
(26)
and, similarly
VPB |PE ≥ VPB |PE ,min =
N0
GQ(χQ + 1/V )
(27)
If one of these inequalities was violated and if Alice had prepared her field with an EPR-beams
based black-box, then Eve and Bob would be able to make a joint measurement of the field
(Q′, P ′) with a better accuracy than allowed by the Heisenberg uncertainty limit.
3.5 Implementation of the entangling cloner
Eve
(Q 
 , P
  )
E1
E1
known known(Q      , P      )
(Q  , P  )E2 E2
B B(Q , P ) BobAlice (Q, P)
T=1−G
EPR
Fig. 5. Implementation of an entangling cloner for G < 1. Eve uses a beamsplitter of
transmission T = 1−G to inject into the line a partially known noise (QE1, PE1) generated with
an EPR source (EPR). She keeps the other output (QE2, PE2) of the beamsplitter which, combined
with her knowledge (Qknown, Pknown) on the injected noise, gives her an estimate of Bob’s beam
(QB, PB).
In a practical QKD scheme, Alice and Bob will give the same roles to Q and P . Assuming
therefore that GQ = GP = G and χQ = χP = χ, the two bounds above reduce to a single
one, and it is possible to explicitly describe an entangling cloner achieving this limit. We will
consider here only the case where G < 1, but the limit is tight for any G. The entangling
cloner can then be sketched as shown in Fig 5: Eve uses a beamsplitter with a transmission
G to split up part of the Alice-Bob transmitted signal, and she injects into the other input
port a field E1, with the right variance to induce a noise of variance GχN0 at Bob’s end. One
has therefore:
〈
Q2E1
〉
=
GχN0
1−G
〈
P 2E1
〉
=
GχN0
1−G (28)
Eve should know the maximum about this injected field E1, and will therefore use an half-
pair of EPR-correlated beams, so that she does perform an “entangling” attack. We can then
write
QE1 = Qknown +Qunknown (29)
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where Qknown stand for Eve’s best estimation of QE1, given by the measure of its brother-
beam, and Qunknown stand for the noise she cannot know. We have〈
Q2unknown
〉
=
N20
〈Q2E1〉
=
(1−G)N0
Gχ
(30)〈
Q2known
〉
=
〈
Q2E1
〉− 〈Q2unknown〉 (31)
Eve also use an output port of the beamsplitter to measure the field E2, which gives her
information about the input field:
QE2 =
√
GQE1 −
√
1−GQ. (32)
She can cancel a part of the noise induced by E1 by subtracting the part proportional to
Qknown. Thus she knows
Q′E2 =
√
GQunknown −
√
1−GQ. (33)
We also have
QB =
√
GQ+
√
1−GQE1. (34)
where Eve already knows the part proportional to Qknown, injected with QE1 and she only
needs to guess
Q′B =
√
GQ +
√
1−GQunknown (35)
from Q′E2. We have therefore
VQB |QE1,QE2 = VQ′B |Q′E2 . (36)
The calculation of the quantities
〈
Q′2B
〉
,
〈
Q′2E2
〉
, 〈Q′E2Q′B〉 leads straightforwardly to the con-
ditional variance
VQ′
B
|Q′
E2
=
N0
Gχ+G/V
= VQB |QE ,min (37)
showing that the entangling cloner does reach the lower limit of Eqs. (26) and (27).
4 Security of reverse-reconciliation based quantum cryptography
4.1 Tolerable noise
In a reverse reconciliation protocol, Eve’s power is limited by the values of VQB |QE ,min and
VPB |PE ,min given by Eqs. (26) and (27). In a security analysis, we have to assume that a
“perfect” Eve is able to reach this limit, that is,
VQB |QE = VQB |QE ,min =
N0
GP (χP + 1/V )
(38a)
VPB |PE = VPB |PE ,min =
N0
GQ(χQ + 1/V )
(38b)
On Alice’s side, the relevant conditional variances are given by Eqs. (22) and (23). Alice’s
and Eve’s conditional variances can be converted into mutual informations by using Shannon’s
formula[24]. For the quadrature Q, we have
IQBA =
1
2
log2
〈
Q2B
〉
VQB |QA
IQBE =
1
2
log2
〈
Q2B
〉
VQB |QE
(39)
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while, for the quadrature P , we have
IPBA =
1
2
log2
〈
P 2B
〉
VPB |PA
IPBE =
1
2
log2
〈
P 2B
〉
VPB |PE
(40)
Following [18, 19], we know that a sufficient condition for reverse reconciliation to give a
non-zero secret key rate is IQBA > I
Q
BE (for the Q quadrature) or I
P
BA > I
P
BE (for the P
quadrature). In terms of conditional variances, this translates into
VQB |QE > VQB |QA or VPB |PE >VPB |PA (41)
Using Eqs. (22), (23) and (38), we obtain (sufficient) conditions for the security of a reverse-
reconciliation based protocol
(GQχQ +GQs)(GPχP +
GP
V
) < 1 or (GPχP +GP s)(GQχQ +
GQ
V
) < 1. (42)
For simplicity reasons, we will assume in the following that all equations are symmetric in Q
and P , in particular GQ = GP = G and χQ = χP = χ,
a so that these conditions simplify
into:
(Gχ+Gs)(Gχ+G/V ) < 1. (43)
This condition can be rewritten by using the definition χ = χ0 + ε, where χ0 =
1−G
G
is the
loss-induced “vacuum noise” and ε is the excess noiseb, giving
[1−G(1− s− ε)][1−G(1 − 1
V
− ε)] < 1. (44)
Since s ≤ 1 and V > 1, this condition is always fulfilled for ε = 0, i.e. when the noise only
originates from losses. This holds for arbitrary high losses (G → 0) and even for coherent
state protocols (s = 1). Therefore, reverse reconciliation provides a simple way to extend the
coherent state protocol of ref. [3] into the high-loss regime.
Finally, one can show that squeezed state protocols are more robust against excess noise
than coherent state protocols. Indeed, by solving Eq. (44), we get
ε < εmax with εmax = 1− 1V − 1G − 12 (s− 1V ) +
√
1
G2
+ 14 (s− 1V )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
< 1 (45)
It is easy to check that this upper limit on ε is less stringent for low values of s, i.e. for strong
squeezing. When the squeezing is maximum (s = 1
V
), we get εmax = 1− 1V . Note also that, in
the limit of high losses (G→ 0), we have εmax = 1− 12 (s+ 1V ). The maximum tolerable excess
noise is shown in Fig. 6 as a function of the losses in the limiting case of high modulation
(V →∞).
aAny experimental implementation of this protocol should however estimate these parameters from statistical
tests, which are likely not to be exactly symmetric.
bStrictly speaking, ε corresponds to the excess noise only in the usual case of losses, where G ≤ 1.
14 Virtual Entanglement and Reconciliation Protocols for Quantum Cryptography with Continuous Variables
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.5
1
2
losses (dB)
e
xc
e
ss
 n
o
is
e 
 (S
ho
tni
se
 U
nit
s)
↑  separability  ↑
↓ entanglement ↓
↓ Reverse Reconciliation with EPR states ↓
↓
 Reverse Reconciliation with coherent states ↓
↓
 Direct Reconciliation ↓
Fig. 6. Tolerable excess noise ε as a function of the losses at the high modulation limit
(V ≫ 1). The RR limit is given by Eq. (45). It reduces to εEPRmax = 1 for EPR states (or maximal
squeezing) at the high modulation limit (s = 1
V
→ 0), and to Eq. (51) for coherent states (dashed
line). The DR security limit defined in Eq. (60) implies that DR is more robust against excess noise
than coherent state RR in the low losses regime. The entanglement limit given by Eq. (59), i.e.
ε = 2, is well above the previous security limits. In the region 1 < ε < 2, no QCV cryptographic
protocol is known, although entanglement is present.
4.2 Secret information rates (EPR vs coherent beams)
The condition (43) can directly be translated into a secret information rate by using Shannon’s
formula (in the case where everything is symmetric in Q and P ) [24]
IBA =
1
2 log2
〈
Q2B
〉
VB|A
IBE =
1
2 log2
〈
Q2B
〉
VB|E
(46)
= 12 log2
V + χ
s+ χ
= 12 log2[(GV +Gχ)(Gχ+G
1
V
)] (47)
The RR secret information rate is therefore
∆I = IBA − IBE = 12 log2
VB|E
VB|A
= 12 log2
1(
Gχ+G 1
V
)
(Gχ+Gs)
(48)
and it is strictly positive if the security condition (43) is fulfilled.
Let us compare the cases where Alice uses EPR or coherent beams. If Alice measures
only one quadrature of an EPR beam (or modulates a maximally squeezed beam compatible
with the total variance V ), we have s = 1/V and εEPRmax = 1 − 1V . Alice and Bob gain
shared information only every second transmission since they don’t always choose the same
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measurement basisc. Therefore,
∆IEPR =
1
4
log2
1(
Gχ+G 1
V
)2 = 12 log2 1Gχ+G 1
V
(49)
=
1
2
log2
1
1−G (1− 1
V
− ε) (50)
In contrast, for coherent beams, we have s = 1 and
εcohmax =
1
2 − 12V − 1G +
√
1
G2
+ 14 (1− 1V )2. (51)
The mutual informations are not dependent of the basis choice (we do not get this prefactor
1/2), so we have
∆Icoh =
1
2
log2
1(
Gχ+G 1
V
)
(Gχ+G)
(52)
= ∆IEPR − 1
2
log2(1 +Gε) (53)
Since the excess noise ε is positive, we obtain
∆Icoh ≤ ∆IEPR. (54)
Both secret rates become equal if and only if the noise only comes from losses (ε = 0 and
G ≤ 1). As in [3], the use of entanglement or squeezing does not improve the secret rate for
losses only, and it becomes advantageous only in the presence of excess noise.
4.3 Strong losses limit
Assuming strong losses (G≪ 1), Eqs. (50) and (53) tend to
∆IEPR ≃ G
2 ln 2
(
1− 1
V
− ε) ∆Icoh ≃ G
2 ln 2
(
1− 1
V
− 2ε) (55)
In the case where there is no excess noise (ε = 0), both rates are equal, as we just said, and
we get ∆IEPR,losses = ∆Icoh,losses. If there is some excess noise in the line, one sees that the
reverse reconciliation protocol is secure as long as as ε < 12 (1− 1V ) ∼ 1/2 for coherent states,
and ε < 1− 1
V
∼ 1 for EPR beams. This shows again that it is always possible to use coherent
states regardless the line losses, though EPR beams make the scheme more robust against
excess noise.
Now, we may compare the secret key rate of the RR coherent-state protocol with BB84’s
net key rate in the case of a lossy errorless channel, which is 12Gn¯ with n¯ = 1 for single photons
and n¯≪ 1 for weak coherent pulses. Taking for instance a 100 km line with 20 dB loss (G =
0.01) and a reasonable modulation (V ≃ 10), the secret key rate is ∆I = 6.5 ·10−3 bit/symbol
for a RR coherent-state protocol. For the same parameters, the secret key rate for BB84
with an ideal single-photon source would be at best 5 · 10−3 bit/time slot, and one order of
magnitude smaller using attenuated light pulses with n¯ = 0.1, even with perfect detectors
cWe suppose that Alice and Bob do not have a quantum memory available.
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(this corresponds to a very recent experimental realization of BB84 [25]). Thus, our reversed-
reconciliation QCV protocol has, in principle, a comparable efficiency to that of ideal BB84
(for strong losses and no excess noise). In particular, with a “symbol rate” of a few MHz,
which should be easy to achieve, the theoretical QCV secret key rate after 100 km would be
more than 10 kbits/sec.
We must stress, however, that in order to achieve this rate, better reconciliation protocols
than those available today should be developed. In their current state, the reconciliation
procedures cannot extract a single secret bit in such a high-loss regime (the highest loss that
can be tolerated in the first experimental demonstration of QCV quantum cryptography is
about 3.1 dB [4]). Indeed, for the values of the parameters above, the information between
Alice and Bob is IAB = 6.2 · 10−2 bit/symbol, which is one order of magnitude larger than
∆I. Hence, the required reconciliation efficiency should be larger than 90 percent in a regime
where the information content (IAB) is of a few hundredth of bit per symbol (or, in other
words, when the signal-to-noise ratio does not exceed about −10 dB).
5 Entanglement versus security criteria
5.1 Virtual entanglement criterion
If the channel between Alice and Bob is too noisy, the virtual entanglement between (QB, PB)
and (Q′, P ′) will be destroyed. The threshold at which this happens can be calculated using
the Duan–Simon entanglement criterion for bivariate gaussian states[26, 27]. This criterion,
expressed by the equation (17) of [26], is
(V − 1)(VB − 1) < C2, (56)
where
VB N0 = 〈QB2〉 = 〈PB2〉 = G(V + χ)N0 (57)
C N0 = 〈Q′QB〉 = −〈P ′ PB〉 =
√
G(V 2 − 1)N0 (58)
In our case, this leads to
G(V − 1)(V − 1 + ε) < G(V − 1)(V + 1) ⇔ ε < 2 (59)
Therefore, virtual entanglement is present as soon as there is non-zero modulation (V > 1)
and non-zero transmission (G > 0), provided that the excess noise of the channel is smaller
than twice the shot-noise limit.
5.2 Security criteria
The security limit against gaussian individual attacks of the QKD protocols discussed in
[3, 4, 6, 7, 11] are simply obtained by comparing conditional variances. For direct protocols
[3], an argument linked to cloning leads to the limit [3, 6, 7]
χ < 1 ⇔ ε < 2− 1
G
, (60)
which ensures that the inequality (59) is fulfilled. For reverse protocols, the inequality (45)
cannot be fulfilled if ε > 1 so that the entanglement condition ε < 2 is also always fulfilled
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when reverse reconciliation is possible. This situation is summarized in Fig. 6, where the
entanglement limit is compared with the DR and RR security limits. The figure makes clear
that the DR and RR cryptographic security thresholds lie well within the entanglement region,
where the channel is able to distribute quantum entanglement. This holds even if no entangled
beams are physically implemented.
It is worth noting that the entanglement threshold is known to coincide, physically, with
an intercept-and-resend attack [28]. In other words, at the point where the joint state of Alice
and Bob becomes separable (ε = 2), there exists an explicit intercept-and-resend attack, so
that obviously no protocol can be secure. The gap between the entanglement condition (59)
and the security limits (60) and (44) corresponds to a region where the known DR and RR
protocols are insecure with respect to gaussian attacks, though intercept-and-resend attacks
cannot be used yet. It is presently unknown whether improved protocols may be devised,
that would remain secure against gaussian attacks in this region.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that reverse reconciliation protocols can be used to extract a
secret key from the exchange of coherent, squeezed or EPR beams between Alice and Bob.
The key is secure against individual gaussian attacks regardless the transmission of the optical
line between Alice and Bob, provided that the excess noise (i.e. the noise beyond the loss-
induced vacuum noise) is not too large. Squeezing or entanglement allow these protocols
to tolerate a larger amount of excess noise, but they are not absolutely required. We have
also shown that the QCV protocols based on gaussian displaced squeezed or coherent states
[3, 4, 6, 7, 11] are equivalent to entangled-beams based protocols, and that the security limits
of these protocols are more severe than the entanglement limit of the equivalent entanglement-
based protocol. This result is certainly compatible with—and even supports—the idea that
they may be unconditionally secure [23].
The difference between the entanglement condition and the security limits in RR or DR
shows that our protocols do not use the full available entanglement. In principle, procedures
based either on quantum entanglement distillation [12, 22] or on classical advantage distillation
[29] can exploit the entanglement up to its ultimate limit. However, it should be noticed
that such protocols are either much more difficult to implement (quantum entanglement
distillation) than the ones we have considered here, or have extremely low practical secret bit
rates (classical advantage distillation). It remains an open question to determine whether the
gap between our security threshold and the entanglement threshold is due to the restricted
observables we can measure through homodyne detection, or to the reconciliation procedure
used to extract the bits, or perhaps to another factor.
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